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NOTES
THE ATTORNEY'S DUTY TO REVEAL A
CLIENT'S INTENDED FUTURE
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
"I'm going to kill the guy who got me in this mess." An attorney
who hears a client make such a statement faces a difficult dilemma. If
he believes that the client intends to commit the crime, the attorney can
inform the police or the intended victim, or he can remain silent.
Unfortunately, current standards of professional responsibility
provide equivocal guidance for attorneys facing such a decision.' In
fact, when the American Bar Association recently moved to replace the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) 2 with new Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules),3 much debate focused on the
1. The standards may be unclear, but the literature on the subject of professional
responsibility is voluminous. In the last few years, the number of publications has risen
dramatically. For two diverse and broad views of the field, compare M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) with G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
(1978).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 1411 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as RULES].
The rules were drafted by the Kutak Commission, a special commission created in 1977,
named after its now-deceased chairman. See Kutak, Chairman's Introduction to RULES (Proposed
Final Draft 1981), reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 1229 (1981). In January, 1980 the Commission issued
a discussion draft of the Rules. RULES (Discussion Draft 1980). It published the discussion draft
with the express purpose of eliciting comments. See Kutak, Chairman's Introduction to RULES
(Discussion Draft 1980). The Commission was not disappointed; it was deluged with comments,
see Kutak, Chairman's Introduction, to RULES (Proposed Final Draft 1981), and periodicals were
filled with critiques of the discussion draft. See, e.g., Review Symposium: The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 921 (1980).
After examining the response to the discussion draft, the Commission published a proposed
final draft in 1981. RULES (Proposed Final Draft 1981). In subsequent meetings of the ABA's
House of Delegates the Rules were debated and amended. In August, 1983 the House of
Delegates finally approved the amended final draft. RULES (1983). See A.B.A. ANNUAL REPORT
1982-1983 13 (1983), reprinted in 70 A.B.A. J. 67 (1984). See generally Clark, Fear and Loathing in
New Orleans: the Sorry Fate of the Kutak Commission's Rules, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 79, 86
(1983).
To become binding in a particular state the Rules must be adopted by either the state
legislature or the highest state court. See White, Why Did the Antitrust Division Dismiss the Case?,
64 A.B.A. J. 1667, 1669 (1978).
Regulation of professional ethics has a long history. In 204 B.C. a Roman statute, lex Cincia,
forbade anyone from accepting money or gifts for pleading a case. See R. POUND, THE LAWYER
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issue of confidentiality.4 During these debates, questions concerning an
attorney's duty to reveal his client's intent to commit a criminal act
caused particular problems.5
This note analyzes the current ethical standards that guide an
attorney when he thinks his client intends to commit a crime.6 It
examines the alternate formulations of the ethical rules found in the
various drafts of the new Rules.7 The note then explores the legal
foundations of the attorney's duty to protect client confidences and the
arguments supporting this duty.8 The note concludes that the best rule
is one that gives the attorney a considerable amount of discretion to
determine what revelations he should make.9
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 52 (1953). Professor Drinker suggests that the first English
attempt to regulate attorneys occured in 1275. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 14-15 (1953); see also
Pickholz, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct-and Other Assaults Upon the
Attorney-Client Relationship: Does "Serving the Public Interest" Disserve the Public Interest?, 36
Bus. LAw 1841, 1842 (1981).
The first formulation of a code of ethics occurred in 1836 when David Hoffman published his
A Course Of Legal Study Addressed to Students and the Professional Generally. See Kalish, David
Hoffman's Essay on Professional Deportment and the Current Legal Ethics Debate, 61 NEB. L. REV.
54 (1982). Alabama adopted the first formal code of ethics in 1887. See generally Armstrong, A
Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1063 (1979) (history of legal ethics). In 1908, the
A.B.A. first adopted its Canons of Professional Responsibility. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
app. C n.l (1953); see also CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). The Code replaced the
Canons in 1969.
4. Confidentiality was not the only area of controversy. For example, the discussion draft's
proposal that all attorneys had an obligation to provide legal services to the poor elicited a
considerable amount of debate. See, e.g., Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated
Objective, 65 A.B.A. J. 564 (1979); Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional
Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (1981).
5. Confidentiality raised other issues too. The duty of an attorney to a corporate client and
the duty of an attorney who knows of his client's perjury were two other highly controversial
issues. See generally Abramovsky, Confidentiality: The Future Crime-Contraband Dilemmas, 85
W. VA. L. REV. 929, 937-40 (1983) (discussion of attorney's duty regarding incriminating
evidence); Crystal, Confidentiality Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 KAN. L. REV.
215 (1982) (general discussion of confidentiality issues); Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A
Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His
Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75 (1981) (problems of confidentiality when client perjures himself); Leiman,
Responsibility to Report Securities Law Violations 6 INST. ON SEc. REG. (PLI) 265 (1975)
(discussion of attorney's duty regarding corporate clients and the SEC); Robins, Policeman,
Conscience or Confidant: Thoughts on the Appropriate Response of a Securities Attorney Who
Suspects Client Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 373 (1982); Note,
Ethics, Law, and Loyalty. The Attorney's Duty to Turn Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32
STAN. L. REv. 977 (1980). These issues are outside the scope of this note.
6. See infra notes 10-25 and accompanying text. The discussion is limited to noncorporate
crimes and does not attempt to examine the crime of perjury.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 26-45.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 48-79.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 80-90.
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I. FORMULATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
RULE
A. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
Currently, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility guides
attorneys in matters of professional responsibility.10 The Code con-
tains three types of guidelines: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and
Disciplinary Rules (DRs). Canons merely state general ethical rules; I
Ethical Considerations are "aspirational in character and represent the
objectives" toward which lawyers should strive.' 2 Disciplinary Rules
define the minimum standards of professional conduct. Thus, if an at-
torney's conduct does not conform to the Disciplinary Rules, he may be
subject to disciplinary action. 13
Canon Four of the Code urges that "A Lawyer Should Preserve
the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."' 4 DR 4-101(B) embodies
much of Canon Four:
[A] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of
his client. (2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvan-
tage of the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the
advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents
after full disclosure.' 5
DR 4-101(C)(3), however, provides that a lawyer may reveal the "in-
tention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime."'16
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the current Disciplinary
Rule imposes any obligation on an attorney to reveal that his client
intends to commit a crime. It says only that the attorney "may" reveal
his client's intent.' 7 A footnote suggests that the attorney might be
obliged to reveal his client's criminal plans in certain situations.' 8 The
10. At least 42 states have adopted or approved the Code of Professional Responsibility. See
Kramer, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: .4 Study in Professional Irresponsibility,
67 GEo. L.J. 991, 994 & n.20 (1979); cf Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: fin.
plications of Tarasofffor Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 275, 276 n.24 (the Code has
been adopted in some form, albeit with significant deletions and modifications, by every state and
the District of Columbia). Different authors apparently have differing criteria as to whether the
Code has been adopted.
11. The Canons are "axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of profes-
sional conduct expected of lawyers." CODE, supra note 2, Preliminary Statement 3, 4 (1979).
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id. Canon 4.
15. Id. DR 4-101(B) (footnotes omitted).
16. Id. DR 4-101(C)(3) (footnotes omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id. Canon 4 n.16 (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965)).
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footnote quotes an opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics of
the American Bar Association 19 for the proposition that if "the facts in
the attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime
will be committed," the attorney has a duty of disclosure. 20 Thus, the
footnote purports to create a mandatory duty to disclose a client's in-
tent to commit a crime if the facts in the attorney's possession indicate
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed.
Two factors suggest, however, that the footnote is not definitive.
First, footnotes to the Code are "intended merely to enable the reader
to relate the provisions of [the] code to the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted in 1908.1' 2 1 The Code's drafters did not intend the foot-
notes to be definitive interpretations of the Disciplinary Rules; the foot-
notes are merely meant to help explain them. Second, the passage
quoted in the footnote is clearly dictum in the committee's opinion. 22
Nevertheless, some commentators argue that DR 4-101 creates a
duty for attorneys to reveal certain crimes their clients intend to com-
mit.23 Others deny that any such obligation exists. 24 This note will
19. The opinions of the Committee are its expressions concerning proper professional con-
duct. Opinions are given after a question is raised by a member of the bar. DRINKER, supra note
3, at 31.
20. CODE, supra note 2, Canon 4 n.16.
21. Id. Preamble n.1.
22. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965) (with respect to practice
before the IRS, a lawyer is under no duty to reveal the weaknesses of his client's case); see also
Leiman, supra note 5, at 267-68 ("That is an obscure note, set in very small type. It seems to me to
be such an oblique way to modify the large, black letter rule that I doubt Note 16 creates a
separate duty.").
Other opinions of the Ethics Committee are similarly confusing. See ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953) (attorney should not inform court of client's
perjury and attorney has no duty to correct court when it imposes sentence based on misinforma-
tion); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936) (attorney must
reveal whereabouts of client who jumps bail); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances, Formal Op. 23 (1930) (attorney should not reveal fugitive client's whereabouts).
Other ABA materials suggest that there is a duty to disclose. See e.g., ABA SECTION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
Standard 4-3.7(d) (2d ed. 1980) (lawyer must reveal expressed intention of client to commit crime
and information required to prevent crime where the crime would seriously endanger life or safety
of person or corrupt processes of courts). The ABA standards are not the law of any jurisdiction
and are not enforced.
23. "[O]ne wouldn't question the lawyer's obligation if the situation were one where a haz-
ardous drug is let loose on the public [by the client]. It would plainly be a lawyer's duty to report
the situation to authorities who could prevent the drug from damaging the public users." Leiman,
supra note 5, at 273.
24. "Outside the tax area, the business practitioner is under no duty to disclose client miscon-
duct .. " Robins, supra note 5, at 422. "It is noteworthy that no federal administrative agency
other than the SEC has adopted, proposed or even informally advocated imposing upon laywers
obligations similar to those proposed by the SEC." Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: .4
New Rolefor Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 476 (1974).
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explore these arguments more fully below.25
B. Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct went through several
drafts before the American Bar Association finally adopted them in
1983.26 All of the drafts required attorneys to protect client confidences
in the same general way. The initial discussion draft provided that:
In giving testimony or providing evidence concerning a client's af-
fairs, a lawyer shall not disclose information concerning the client
except as authorized by the applicable law of evidentiary privilege.
In other circumstances, a lawyer shall not disclose information about
a client which relates to the client-lawyer relationship, which would
embarrass the client, which is likely to be detrimental to the client, or
which the client has requested not be disclosed .... 27
Callan and David believe that no law requires an attorney to disclose client misconduct:
Criminal offenses such as aiding and abetting a crime, obstruction of justice, misprision
of a felony, or becoming an accessory after the fact arguably might be applied to attor-
neys for failure to disclose their clients' criminal misconduct. Such an application, how-
ever, would be wholly inappropriate since it would conflict with attorneys' legal duty of
confidentiality deriving from the attorney-client privilege. . . and would impermissibly
interfere with their clients' exercise of the privilege against self incrimination. These
principles are basic to our system of justice, and the duty of silence which they mandate
cannot logically be considered an obstruction of justice or conduct which aids the com-
mission of a crime or fraud.
Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client
Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 332, 357 n. 109 (1976); see also infra
notes 48-54 and accompanying text; Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Pro.
fessionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1244
(1962) (generally the attorney has no duty to come forward).
25. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 3. The American Trial Lawyers Association also formulated a code of
conduct. See THE ROSCOE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION COMMISSION ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (Discussion Draft
1980). While discussing the ABA Rules, the introduction to their code states: "The proponents of
an alternative to this Code have apparently forgotten that [our system of justice is an adversary
one]. Their most recent draft would erode basic constitutional protections by making the lawyer
the agent of the state, not the champion of the client, in many important respects." Introduction,
to id at iii.
The Foundation was unable to agree on the circumstances in which disclosure of client confi-
dences would be appropriate. See The Client's Trust and Confidences, Comment in id at 105.
Consequently, the Foundation published two alternative provisions. One version provides: "A
lawyer may reveal a client's confidence when the lawyer reasonably believes that divulgence is
necessary to prevent imminent danger to human life. In such a case, the lawyer shall use all
reasonable means to protect the client's interests, consistent with preventing loss of life." Id, Rule
1.4, Alternative A. The most significant variation found in the second version of the Foundation's
confidentiality rule is the lack of a provision similar to the one just quoted. Id, Rule 1.4, Alterna-
tive B. That is, Alternative B contains no provision for revealing intended client wrongdoing.
27. RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980). Later drafts simplified the lan-
guage of the rule: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
except as [otherwise provided], unless the client consents after disclosure." Id, Rule 1.6 (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981). This broadens the scope of protected information.
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Several changes from the old Code are apparent in this new rule.
The rule protects information relating to the representation that the at-
torney acquired before or after the professional relationship with the
client was formed, regardless of how it was obtained;28 the Code pro-
tected only "confidences and secrets" acquired from the client during
the lawyer-client relationship. 29 The rule also broadens the scope of
protected information by changing what the lawyer is instructed not to
reveal. "Confidences and secrets" 30 is a narrow formulation of pro-
tected material relative to the provision in the proposed final draft of
the Rules that protects "information relating to the representation of a
client., 3 1
The various drafts of the Rules differed in the extent to which they
required that the attorney reveal what he knows. The initial discussion
draft of the rule provided that: "A lawyer shall disclose information
about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client
from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily
harm to another person. '32 Thus, this draft mandated disclosure to
prevent death or serious bodily harm. For disclosure to be mandatory
under the initial discussion draft of the Rules, the act that would cause
death or serious bodily harm did not have to be criminal, fraudulent, or
in any way wrongful.33 This was a major change from the Code be-
cause, as noted above,34 the Code arguably did not mandate disclosure
of intended acts of any kind. Later drafts of the rule returned to the
Code's position and did not mandate revelation of any intended
crimes. 35
The various drafts of the Rules each provided exceptions to the
general principle forbidding attorneys from disclosing confidential in-
formation about their clients. The drafts, however, varied considerably
in the extent to which they excepted from protected status an attorney's
knowledge that his client intended to commit a crime. Early drafts per-
mitted revelation of less serious intended offenses; the later drafts pro-
tected nonserious crimes from revelation.
28. RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 note (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
29. See id; CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101(A).
30. CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101(A) ("confidence" is material protected by lawyer-client
privilege, whereas "secret" refers to information gained in the professional relationship whose
disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client).
31. RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
32. Id. Rule 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980).
33. See id
34. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
35. RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft 1981 & Amended Final Draft 1982).
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Regarding less serious crimes, the discussion draft provided that a
lawyer may disclose information about a client "[t]o the extent it ap-
pears necessary to prevent or rectify the consequences of a deliberately
wrongful act by the client."' 36 The Code had allowed an attorney to
reveal his client's intent to commit a crime.37 The discussion draft of
the Rules significantly broadened this authorization. It instructed the
lawyer that he could reveal confidences in order to prevent or rectify a
deliberate wrong.38 Because many wrongs are not criminal, the discus-
sion draft's reference to a "deliberate wrong" was a broader formula-
tion than the Code's reference to "a crime." 39
The next draft of the Rules, the proposed final draft, made several
substantive changes in the permissive-disclosure provisions of the
Rules. With respect to serious crimes, rather than mandating an attor-
ney to reveal a client's intent to commit any act when such revelation
would prevent death or injury, the proposed final draft would have al-
lowed the lawyer to reveal an intended act likely to result in death or
bodily injury only when the client's intent was criminal or fraudulent.40
This change not only removed the obligation to reveal a client's intent
to commit an act that might cause serious bodily injury; it also forbade
the attorney from revealing a client's intent to commit an act that might
cause bodily injury if that act were neither criminal nor fraudulent.4'
With regard to less serious crimes, the proposed final draft limited
the lawyer to revealing a criminal or fraudulent act likely to result in
substantial injury to financial or property interests.42 Unlike the dis-
cussion draft, it did not permit an attorney to reveal that his client
merely intended to commit a wrongful act. In order to be disclosable
under the proposed final draft, a wrongful act had to be criminal or
fraudulent and cause serious financial or bodily harm.
The rule that the ABA ultimately adopted moved even further to-
36. Id. Rule 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980) (the rule made it clear that a lawyer could not reveal
to rectify a previous wrongful act when he was employed after the act to represent the client
concerning the act).
37. CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101(B).
38. RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980).
39. A wrongful act is an act that violates a penal or civil standard in which knowledge of the
circumstances is an element of the violation. RULES, supra note 3, at 6 (Discussion Draft 1980).
Although this change expanded the scope of protected information by allowing the revelation of
nonpenal wrongs, it also narrowed the scope. The current code allows revelation of a crime.
Arguably a strict liability crime is revealable; because knowledge is not an element of the violation
of a strict liability crime, it is not considered to be a wrongful act. See Landesman, Conjidentiallty
and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 765, 766 (1980).
40. RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
41. See id
42. Id
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ward protecting client confidences; 43 the lawyer may reveal informa-
tion only to prevent the client from committing a criminal act likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.44 The lawyer may
no longer reveal information only to prevent serious financial harm.45
These final provisions are much narower than the Code's disclo-
sure provisions. Under the Rules, the lawyer may not reveal that his
client is going to commit an egregious crime unless that crime will re-
sult in death or bodily injury. Like the Code, the Rules currently do
not mandate any disclosure.
II. THE BASIS FOR THE ATTORNEY'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Legal Basis of the Duty.
Clearly, the current Code and the various drafts of the Rules do
not agree on an attorney's responsibilities when confronted with a cli-
ent who intends to commit a crime. An analysis of the legal concepts
that give rise to the attorney's duty of confidentiality demonstrates that
an attorney may reveal a client's intended crime. The duty to protect
client confidences has two foundations. The first foundation of the
duty is the attorney-client privilege from the rules of evidence.46 The
second foundation for this responsibility derives from the fiduciary
duty of an agent to his principal.47
1. Attorney-Client Privilege. Scholars debate the history of the
attorney-client privilege,48 but its outlines are well-settled. Wigmore
gave the classic definition of the privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the privilege be waived.4 9
43. Id. (1983). See supra note 3.
44. Id, Rule 1.6 (1983).
45. Id
46. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
48. Compare 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ("The
history of this privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth, where the privilege already appears as
unquestioned .... The policy of the privilege has been plainly grounded, since the latter part of
the 1700s ....") with Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) ("[T]he historical foundations of the privilege are not as firm as the
tenor of Wigmore's language suggests. On the contrary, recognition of the privilege was slow and
halting until after 1800.").
49. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, at § 2292 (footnote & emphasis omitted); see also United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (contains another
widely-quoted definition of the privilege).
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Originally, the privilege belonged to the attorney who, as a gen-
tleman, was obliged not to violate a pledge of secrecy.50 Modern the-
ory has abandoned this position and now holds that the privilege
belongs to the client.5' Because the privilege is the client's, not the at-
torney's, the attorney can not waive the privilege and disclose his cli-
ent's secrets, even if he believes revelation is desirable.
Although the attorney may not choose to waive the privilege, the
attorney-client privilege does not completely protect a client's secrets.
The privilege is strictly construed5 2 and does not apply to every trans-
action between attorney and client. 53 In addition there is a "crime-
fraud" exception to the privilege. This exception removes protection
from communications made for the purpose of furthering a crime or
fraud. 54 Therefore, most communications of the sort under discussion
in this note are not protected. Nevertheless, the mere fact that informa-
tion is not privileged does not impose a duty on the attorney to reveal
that information.
2. An Agent's Responsibility to His Princoal. Principles of
agency law may also limit an attorney's discretion to disclose client
confidences. Because an attorney is an agent of his client,55 he has a
fiduciary obligation to his'cient. 6 The fiduciary duty created by the
attorney-client relationship obliges the attorney to hold inviolate his
client's confidences. Unless they agree otherwise, an agent is subject to
a duty to his principal not to use or communicate information confi-
dentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during the
course of his agency.5 7 The agent cannot use information in competi-
tion with, or to the detriment of, the principal, even though the infor-
50. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, at § 2290; see also United States v. Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 401 F. Supp. 361, 369-70 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (citing Wigmore); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13,
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (citing Wigmore), afl'dsub nom. Colton v. United States 306 F. 2d 633 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 951 (1963); see also Hazard, supra note 52, at 1070.
51. See, e.g., People v. Fentress, 103 Misc. 2d 179, 189, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485, 492 (Dutchess Cty.
Ct. 1980).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("whatever their origins, these
[Fifth Amendment, attorney-client, and priest-penitent] exceptions to the demand for every man's
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search
for truth").
53. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F. 2d 1093, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970), cert deniedsub nora
Garner v. First Amer. Life Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974 (1971); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, at § 2292.
54. See Grant,Attorney-Client Privilege and the Proposed Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, 6 J. CRIM. DEF. 163, 168 (1980); Hellerstein, Current Attorney-Cl ent Privilege Issues, 4
ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J. 5,7 (1979).
55. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, at § 2291.
56. Id
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
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mation does not relate to the transaction in which he is then employed,
unless the information is a matter of general knowledge.5 8
This rule of agency protects more material than does the attorney-
client privilege. For example, the attoney-client privilege applies only
to a legal relationship; yet agency principles limit an attorney even
when he is not acting in his professional capacity. The attorney-client
privilege protects client confidences from involuntary revelation only in
judicial proceedings; but agency law limits an attorney's ability to re-
veal a client's secrets in other contexts as well.
As with the attorney-client privilege, however, there is an excep-
tion to the general rule requiring agents to preserve their principal's
secrets. An agent is privileged to reveal information that he acquired in
confidence in the course of his agency in order to protect a superior
interest of his own or of a third person. Thus, if the agent knows that
the principal is committing or is about to commit a crime, the agent is
under no duty not to reveal what he knows.5 9 Although the agent is
free to expose his principal's intended crime, agency law does not re-
quire the agent to do so.
3. Potential Legal Limits on Maintaining Client Confidentiality.
A court might use other legal bases to creat a duty to reveal certain
client confidences. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia,60 the California Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist has a duty
under negligence principles to protect the intended victim of a violent
crime. Similarly, some commentators now believe that the same tort
principles require a lawyer to warn of a client's intent to commit a
criminal act.6 '
The Tarasoff court held that: "When a therapist determines, or
pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his
patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an
obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger." 62 The court reasoned that the therapist-patient relation-
ship is a special relationship that creates a duty to control a patient's
conduct. 63 The court recognized the importance of confidentiality in
58. Id
59. Id § 395 comment f.
60. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976).
61. See general Merton, supra note 10. One clear distinction between lawyers and psychia-
trists is that lawyers have never suggested that they have the ability to detect a predilection for
violence. See id at 330. On the other hand, it is not as necessary for a client to tell a lawyer of his
criminal intentions as it is for a patient to tell his psychiatrist of his criminal intentions.
62. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
63. Id at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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the therapist-patient relationship, but suggested that the duty to warn
others might outweigh it.64
The logic employed by the Tarasoff court could force lawyers to
warn their client's intended victims. As noted above, an attorney's
knowledge that a client is going to harm someone is not privileged.
The lawyer-client relationship could be sufficiently special to justify
imposing on the attorney the duty to control his client's actions. As in
Tarasoff, the interest of the lawyer and his client in confidentiality may
be outweighed by the public's need for safety.
In Hawkins v. King County Department of.Rehabilitation Services,65
a lawyer was sued by the parents of his client's victim for failing to
reveal, at a bail hearing, that his client was violently insane. The
Washington Court of Appeals held that "the duty of counsel to be loyal
to his client and to represent zealously his client's interest overrides the
nebulous and unsupported theory that our rules and ethical code man-
date disclosure of information which counsel considers detrimental to
his client's stated interest. ' 66 The court, however, was "persuaded by
the position advanced by amicus 'that the obligation to warn, when
confidentiality would be compromised to the client's detriment, must
be permissive at most, unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that
the client has formed a firm intention to inflict serious personal injuries
on a unknowing third person.' ",67 By implication then, it is quite possi-
ble that with a different set of facts the Hawkins court would have rec-
ognized a duty to warn. This would create a duty on the part of
atorneys to warn of their client's intended crimes. 68
64. Id at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
65. 24 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979).
66. Id. at 343, 602 P.2d at 365. This is the only reported case against an attorney that has
employed reasoning similar to that in Tarasoff.
67. Id at 344, 602 P.2d at 365. There was also a suggestion in dictum that a common law
duty to volunteer information to a court considering pretrial release might exist if the attorney
were convinced beyond a doubt that the client was going to inflict injury on unknowing third
persons. Id
68. The Securities and Exchange Commission contends that attorneys have a duty to the
public that entails disclosing a client's intended wrongs. See SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978) (Commission charged attorneys with failing to notify
the Commission concerning the misleading nature of financial statements to be issued by a client).
See also In re Carter, 1981 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (SEC Release No. 34-17597). SEC
Chairman Harold M. Williams has stated that he believes an attorney must reveal a corporate
client's ongoing fraud. Williams, Corporate Accountabili
, 
and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW
RaV. 7, 8 (1978). Because the Commission can bar an attorney from practicing before it through
the use of section 5(e) of its rules of practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.5(e) (1983), its views are significant.
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B. The Practical Bases for the Duty of Confidentiality.
Neither agency nor evidence law forbids an attorney from re-
vealing that his client intends to commit certain crimes. Yet agency
law, evidence law, and professional codes of ethics do not currently
require an attorney to reveal his client's intent to commit a crime. Nu-
merous arguments have ben advanced in suport of an attorney's ethical
obligation to maintain confidentiality. Proponents argue that confiden-
tiality ensures effective assistance of counsel, 69 fundamental fairness, 70
and reduction of crime.71 They argue that the attorney-client relation-
ship is extremely important and that any harm caused by the breach of
the attorney-client relationship must be outweighed by the benefits of
the breach.
One rationale behind the rule of confidentiality is that a client,
knowing his secrets are safe, will divulge information necessary for his
lawyer to provide adequate representation and advice.7 2 If an attorney
is to represent his client adequately, he should have full knowledge of
the circumstances surrounding the client's questionable conduct. Often
the client will not know how much of the information he possesses is
relevant. Therefore, it is important that the client tell the attorney
everything he knows. If the client screens the information he imparts
to his attorney, because of worries about what the attorney must then
disclose to proper authorities, he may screen out relevant information.
The integrity of the adversary system depends on a client's faith in con-
fidentiality and the attorney-client relationship.
Reducing the inviolability of an attorney-client confidence may
also reduce the quality of legal advice given.73 If an attorney has a
duty to reveal intended crimes, he will be quite cautious in advising his
client. If the attorney is afraid of incurring personal liability, he may
69. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
72. See Ambramovsky, supra note 5, at 931 ("primary goal of the confidentiality doctrine is
to ensure that a client may freely inform his lawyer of any and all pertinent facts and circum-
stances") (footnote omitted); Crystal, supra note 5, at 224 ("such rules foster an important social
purpose by facilitating communication between lawyers and clients"); see also People v. Beige, 83
Misc. 2d 186, 189, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798, 801 (Onondaga Cty. Ct.) ("effectiveness of counsel is only as
great as the confidentiality of its client-attorney relationship. If the lawyer cannot get all the facts
about the case, he can only give his client half of a defense."), aif'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d
771 (1975) (per curiam).
73. ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Statement of PolicyAdopted by
American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers Advising with Re-
spect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 31 Bus. LAW. 543, 545 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA Statement]. See Robins, supra note
5, at 413-15.
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advise his client not to follow a likely legal, but nevertheless questiona-
ble, course of conduct in order to insure that he will not be subject to
liability for failure to reveal the crime, if the conduct is indeed
criminal.74
Another advantage of a strict confidentiality rule is that it pro-
motes a sense of fairness, at least among potential litigants. 75 The legal
justice system is complex.
People with legal problems need help; they often do not understand
the complicated legal system in which they are enmeshed. Their
sense of fairness... is enhanced when they need not fend for them-
selves. . . . This simple and powerful ideal of legal representation
is obviously sacrificed when a client senses that his attorney's loyal-
ties are divided.76
If the client knows that his secrets are safe with his attorney his
sense that the legal system will treat him fairly is enhanced. On the
other hand, if the client believes that an attorney has a duty to reveal
the client's secrets, his sense of fairness is diminished. A client who
believes that his attorney's loyalties are divided between the client and
society in general, may feel that society has an unfair edge. "He told
me to tell him everything, then he went and turned me in," might be a
client's response to an attorney's disclosure of his secrets. If a client
believes that an attorney has not dealt fairly, confidence and trust in the
legal system will surely diminish. An appearance of fairness gives the
legal system legitimacy and should not be lightly sacrificed. 77
74. "The client's actions should not be improperly narrowed through the insistence of an
attorney who may, perhaps unconsciously, eliminate available choices from consideration because
of his concern over possible personal risks if the position is taken which, though supportable, is
subject to uncertainty or contrary to a known, but perhaps erroneous, position of the SEC or a
questionable lower court decision." ABA Statement, supra note 73, at 545.
The rule of confidentiality has constitutional implications. A client has fifth- and sixth-
amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and a privilege against self-incrimination.
U.S. CoNsT. amends. V & VI. It is thought that a lawyer must protect a client's secrets in order to
provide effective assistance of counsel. If the attorney functions as a conduit for information from
his client to the state, the client is forced to choose between effective assistance of counsel and
incriminating himself through his attorney's revelations. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (dictum); see also Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules Balancing
and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464, 485 (1977).
75. See generally Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among
Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 349 (1981).
76. Id at 351-52. Little is known about the extent of clients's knowledge about the attorney-
client privilege and how much faith they have that their attorneys will not reveal their secrets.
One study found that 71 out of its 108 subjects believed that an attorney would not reveal matters
told to them in confidence. 34 of the subjects believed that an attorney would not disclose a
confidence even if ordered by a judge. Note, supra note 24, at 1062.
77. Fairness, as distinguished from factual correctness, has long been an important concern
of the American justice system. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
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Finally, the duty of confidentiality may actually reduce crime.78 If
a client believes that his attorney will "turn him in" if he reveals his
intent to commit a crime, then he likely will not reveal his plans to his
attorney, depriving the attorney of an opportunity to inform the client
of a lawful course of action that would accomplish the client's desired
end. A client who knows that his attorney will not reveal his intended
crime is more likely to discuss the intended crime with the attorney
who may persuade his client to follow a lawful course of action.79
III. THE HARMs OF A MANDATORY RULE AND THE BENEFITS OF
DISCLOSURE
Although attorneys continue to argue over what they ought to dis-
close and whether they should ever be required to disclose,80 few con-
(1945) (long-arm jurisdiction dependent upon "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice").
78. See Leiman, supra note 5, at 276 n.97 (1975).
79. Other commentators deny that attorneys are able to convince their clients not to commit
crimes. See Crystal, supra note 5, at 225-26; Robins, supra note 5, at 409-12. Crystal's views are
discussed infra note 82.
80. Some attorneys reject the notion of a duty to protect third parties. "[I]t is clear that the
lawyer for a private party is and should be an officer of the court only in the sense of serving a
court as a zealous, partisan advocate in one side of the case before it, and in the sense of having
been licensed by the court to play that very role." Legal Times of Wash., June 21, 1982, at 2, col. 3
(quoting T. Koskoff, former President of the American Trial Lawyers Foundation). If an attorney
is to function as an advocate, that role must come before any role as a watchdog of public safety.
But see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpired View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Thur-
man, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests that Outweigh Confidentiality, 1980 J. LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 5 (both authors argue that truth must outweigh the adversary system). In one sense the
attorney must hold his client's confidences inviolate because they are not his to disclose. The
client, when he confides in his attorney, still owns the confidence. The attorney is not free to do as
he wishes with the "property" of his client merely because he believes revealing it will do more
good than harm. See Landesman, supra note 39, at 775.
Others simply argue that considerations of fairness and balancing are irrelevant. According
to this theory the attorney-client relationship is a personal one, founded on one's moral right to
choose one's friends, therefore
expediency may not compromise the nature of the relation. . . . [T]o allow social con-
siderations-even social regulations-to limit and compromise what by hypothesis is an
entailment of the original grant of right to the individual is to take away with the left
hand what was given with the right. Once the relation has been taken up, it is the client's
needs which hold the reins-legally and morally.
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend- The Moral Foundationz of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1077 (1976).
Of course, the lawyer is an autonomous moral unit. Considerations of who "owns" a confi-
dence and moral relationships cannot change that fact. See Landesman, supra note 39, at 777 (as
strong as considerations arguing for holding confidences inviolate are, "they cannot be strong
enough to remove the hearer's own moral autonomy, his right and duty to act on stronger counter-
vailing reasons"). But see Fried, supra, at 1084 ("one must not transfer uncritically the whole
range of personal moral scruples into the arena of legal friendship").
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tend that disclosure of client confidences is always improper.8' Rules
that hold client confidences inviolate serve important social interests;
these interests are not as clearly advanced when an attorney conceals
his knowledge of a client's intended crime. Rules designed to en-
courage clients to assist their attorneys by providing all of the informa-
tion necessary for adequate representation need not also protect a
client's future criminal activity. Nevertheless, a rule that requires attor-
neys to preserve their client's confidences in all but the most extreme
cases may be necessary to encourage clients to be candid with their
attorneys about less extreme but nonethelesss questionable conduct.
Preserving the client's confidences not only assists in securing adequate
representation but also enhances the possibility that an attorney may
prevent a crime. The importance of a client's perception of fairness
should also not be underestimated.
Thus the drafters of a rule governing attorney disclosure of client
confidences must accomodate competing interests: the interest of the
client and society in assuring that the client can, and will, honestly dis-
close his predicament to an attorney, and society's interest in assuring
that innocent third parties are not victimized. A rule that makes attor-
ney disclosure of client confidences mandatory in certain circumstances
should be assessed in terms of these competing interests. An ideal rule
would prevent all serious crimes that a client informs his attorney he
intends to commit, yet still protect a client's and society's interests in
confidentiality. Mandatory rules can not reach this goal.
Discretionary rules offer benefits comparable to mandatory rules,
without the attendant harms. Mandatory rules offer limited benefits
because they would be triggered only rarely. Yet, the harms of
mandatory disclosure are significant. Attorneys, however, share soci-
ety's horror of heinous crime; they also appreciate the harms of unwar-
ranted disclosure of client confidences. Thus, so long as rules permit
attorneys to exercise reasonable discretion, society can enjoy the bene-
fits of disclosure without suffering the harms that accompany
mandatory disclosure.
A. The Benefits and Harms of Mandatory Disclosure.
A mandatory disclosure obligation might be justified if it saved
many lives. Practical considerations suggest that it would not. The dis-
cussion draft of the Rules provided that in some situations disclosure
81. Alschuler comes closest to a demand for absolute confidentiality. Alschuler, supra note
74, at 355 ("the obligation of confidentiality is not a categorical imperative. Hardly anything is,
Nevertheless, it comes close .... ")
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should be mandatory.8 2 But situations where disclosure would be re-
quired under such a rule would be rare. Few clients inform their attor-
neys of their genuine intent to commit a serious crime. Indeed, a
mandatory disclosure obligation would likely make such disclosures
even more rare. When clients learn that their secrets are not safe with
their attorneys, "[t]he result inevitably would be that clients would
withhold the less pleasant and less comfortable truths from their law-
yers." 83 One of the uncomfortable truths which clients are likely to
withhold is the intention to commit a crime. If clients learn that their
lawyers will not respect their secrets, they will no longer divulge them.
Therefore, because few clients would inform their attorneys of an in-
tent to kill, a mandatory rule would have the potential for saving only
an extremely limited number of lives.
The number of intended victims saved by attorneys' revelation is
likely to be smaller yet. A mandatory disclosure rule would have to be
carefully drafted. The rule would have to define precisely the class of
intended crimes that must be disclosed, how certain an attorney must
be that, in the absence of disclosure, the client will commit the crime,
and the degree to which the attorney must know that disclosure will
prevent the crime. Proving that an attorney should have disclosed in-
formation would be inherently difficult. The only witnesses that the
attorney had the information will, in the vast majority of cases, be the
attorney and the criminal. It is hard to imagine courts accepting argu-
ments from accused persons that their attorney should have prevented
their crimes through disclosure. Thus, unless the attorney calls his own
conduct into question, which seems unlikely, it will be difficult to en-
force such a rule. An unenforceable mandatory rule would likely be no
more effective in saving lives than would a straightforward reliance on
discretion.
The limited benefits of a mandatory rule must be weighed against
its potential harms. A mandatory rule is not likely to save lives that
82. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Commentators argue for mandatory dis-
closure on varied grounds. Abramovsky argues for mandatory disclosure on the ground that the
utmost goal of any society is the preservation of human life. Abramovsky, supra note 5, at 937.
Crystal argues, unconvincingly, that a carefully defined disclosure obligation would not impede
communication because communications are already impeded. He makes the standard argument
that one should avoid certain harm over speculative benefits. Crystal, supra note 5, at 224. Burt
argues that mandatory disclosure would increase trust between attorney and client by clarifying
their relationship. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1015
(1981). See also Callan & David, supra note 24, at 356.
83. Freedman, The Kutak ModelRules v. the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, 26 VILL. L.
RaV. 1165, 1175 (1981).
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would not be saved with a discretionary rule;8 4 it does, however, have
the potential to cause a great deal of harm. A mandatory disclosure
obligation could even cost lives. Consider the not unlikely case where
an attorney with knowledge convinces his client not to commit further
crimes such as killing witnesses or fellow conspirators. With a
mandatory disclosure policy, the attorney might never learn of his cli-
ent's criminal intent and, thus, would never be able to dissuade him
from committing the additional crime. The limited benefits to be ob-
tained from a mandatory rule do not outweigh the harms of such a
rule.85
B. The Alternative of Preserving Attorney Discretion to Disclose.
Even without a mandatory rule, many lives can be saved. The
great majority of attorneys would exercise their discretion to reveal a
client's intended crime in the situations in which most agree it is appro-
priate-those where the client threatens to injure or kill someone. A
mandatory rule could only affect the margin, where agreement regard-
ing disclosure is not universal. In these cases some practitioners would
reveal, while others, confronted with identical facts, would not. This is
the only class of cases where a mandatory rule might save lives which
the discretionary rule would not. Few lives in this limited class would
actually be saved, however.
Some commentators argue that if attorneys have discretion they
will play it safe and never disclose what they know.8 6 This argument
seems specious. The ever-present possibility of tort liability should
convince the attorney to exercise his discretion wisely. Whatever ethi-
cal standards the legal profession adopts, these standards will not be
binding on judges in nondisciplinary procedings. The psychiatrist in
Tarasoff argued that he was prevented from revealing information by
an ethical code. The California court did not accept this argument and
imposed tort liability.8 7
84. The ability of discretionary rules to save lives is discussed infra text accompanying notes
86-88.
85. Other commentators argue against mandatory disclosure. Merton argues against a
mandatory standard largely on the impossibility of a lawyer determining whether a client truly
intends to carry out his threat. Merton, supra note 10, at 330. Grant argues against mandatory
disclosure because of the untenable position in which an attorney would be put if the ABA re-
quires disclosure and states retain statutes that prohibit such revelation. Grant, supra note 54, at
178 (fails to cite state law prohibiting revelation).
86. Crystal argues that because lawyers favor their client's interests a discretionary standard
will result in confidentiality. See Crystal, supra note 5, at 227.
87. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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More importantly, attorneys are trained to exercise discretion and
balance competing interests. Perhaps better than anyone else, attorneys
understand the value of confidentiality. Attorneys are trained to assist
clients in crafting effective strategies for resolving their most delicate
problems. In short, most attorneys are quite qualified to make the deci-
sions that a discretionary rule necessitates. 88 This leads to the conclu-
sion that most of the lives saved by a mandatory rule will also be saved
with a discretionary rule.
Assuming that a discretionary rule is chosen, what crimes should
an attorney have discretion to reveal? Certainly crimes threatening
death or serious bodily injury should be included. What of serious fi-
nancial loss? There is probably less reason to reveal financial crimes.
It is not too difficult, however, to conceive of financial crimes that war-
rant revelation. For example, the cartoon scenario of financial wrong-
doing that could plunge the global economy into chaos might warrant
disclosure. Clearly such a situation is extremely unlikely. 89 But if at-
torneys can discern life-threatening situations surely they can also
know when to reveal the rare financial crime that warrants disclosure.
Attorneys should not be given unbridled discretion. Some crimes
can never warrant revelation; a client's intent to jaywalk does not rise
to the level of seriousness where revelation should ever be allowed. Be-
tween the crimes of jaywalking and murder a line must be drawn, but
where it should be drawn is unclear. A line that defines specific crimes
to be revealed seems unwise. One might think crimes of battery should
be revealed, yet should a client's intent to slap his spouse be revealed?
Cases near the borderline would always arise which should be treated
contrary to the rule. The best rule would limit attorney discretion with-
out defining it. A rule that authorized attorneys to reveal plans of "se-
rious crimes" would serve this purpose.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the best rule is the one con-
tained in the proposed final draft of the Model Rules. 90 The rule had
no mandatory disclosure provisions. It gave the attorney the discretion
to reveal his client's intended serious crimes. At the same time, the
discretion vested in the attorney was not so broad as to allow him to
reveal all intended crimes. This rule gave attorneys discretion, but only
in those situations in which nonrevelation could cause serious harm.
88. See Note, Proposed Model Rule L6 Its Effect on a Lawyer's Moral and Ethical Decisions
with Regard to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 Baylor L. Rev. 561, 583-84 (1983).
89. Consider, however, that even the Hunt brothers' effort to corner the market on silver set
off a "wild gyration" in the stock market. See generally Triggering Turmoil, Wall Street J., March
28, 1980, at I, col. I.
90. See supra note 40-42 and accompanying text.
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Such a rule would protect a client's interests in all cases but those
where those interests directly infringe on more important interests.
Timothy J Miller
